Balance Preliminar de las Economías de América Latina y el Caribe – CEPAL – 2017

Durante 2016 la economía mundial mantuvo la tendencia de bajo crecimiento que ha venido mostrando en los últimos ocho años y alcanzó una tasa de expansión del 2,2%, la más baja desde la crisis financiera internacional del período 2008-2009. Al igual que en años anteriores, la dinámica del crecimiento fue empujada por las economías en desarrollo, cuya expansión fue del 3,6% en 2016, mientras que las economías desarrolladas crecieron un 1,5%.

Las proyecciones de crecimiento para 2017 muestran un mayor dinamismo y se espera que la economía mundial crezca en torno al 2,7%, como resultado de un mejor desempeño tanto de las economías emergentes como de las desarrolladas. En el grupo de las economías emergentes, se espera un crecimiento del 4,4% y, tal como en 2016, un desempeño destacado de la India, donde el crecimiento previsto para 2017 es de un 7,7%. Para China se espera una reducción del crecimiento, que llegaría a una tasa cercana al 6,5%. Por su parte, la Federación de Rusia y el Brasil pasarán de tasas de crecimiento negativas en 2016 a tasas positivas en 2017.

Para las economías desarrolladas se espera en 2017 un crecimiento promedio del 1,7%. En este grupo, la economía de los Estados Unidos sería la más dinámica, con una tasa de crecimiento esperada del 1,9%, mientras que la zona del euro presentaría una tasa de crecimiento del 1,7%. El crecimiento económico del Japón, por su parte, se aceleraría hasta una tasa del 0,9% en 2017.

El volumen de comercio mundial muestra tasas de crecimiento aun menores que las de la economía mundial, ya que en 2016 alcanzaría una expansión del 1,7%, inferior al 2,3% registrado en 2015. Como resultado de este débil desempeño, en el bienio 2015-2016 el crecimiento del comercio mundial es inferior al crecimiento del PIB mundial por primera vez en 15 años, con la excepción de 2009, período de plena crisis económica y financiera. Entre los factores que permiten explicar el escaso dinamismo del comercio se pueden identificar algunos de carácter cíclico (la deprimida demanda agregada mundial y una caída importante de la tasa de inversión) y otros de carácter estructural (un menor crecimiento de las cadenas globales de valor, la llamada “localización” y la menor expansión de la economía de China).

Para 2017, el repunte esperado de la economía mundial —que se traduciría en una mejora en los factores cíclicos mencionados— permite prever un aumento de la tasa de crecimiento del volumen de comercio mundial, que se ubicaría en un rango entre el 1,8% y el 3,1%.

Lea y descargue completo BALANCE PRELIMINAR ECONOMIA AMERICA LATINA 2016.

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Behind China and Russia’s ‘Special Relationship’ – Bob Savic – The Diplomat

The rise of a more politically and militarily assertive Russia and an economically and institutionally ascendant China may be characterized as the two principal forces challenging the United States in global policymaking.

China’s and Russia’s strategies for international expansion, in each of their respective areas of policy specialization, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Arguably, both countries’ intensified involvement on the world stage is not only complementary but to a growing extent directly and indirectly supportive of each other’s increasingly commonly-defined interests.

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The growing international significance of China and Russia’s key political and economic partnership must be considered a major factor in global policymaking going forward.

China-Russia Relations Before 2014 

China and Russia have largely formulated their economic and political relations based on an evolving series of strategic partnerships. While there is no “model” strategic partnership, in the sense that the terms are negotiated individually with a partner state, both countries have incorporated certain core principles into each partnership.

Following two partnership agreements in 1994 and 1996 and a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 2001, the 2012 comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation (the 2012 Strategic Partnership), underlined the principles of mutual benefit, mutual trust, and equality in addition to setting specific economic targets in China-Russia bilateral relations.

Notably, although the 2012 Strategic Partnership, signed by President Hu Jintao, China’s president at the time, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, was intended to provide the basis for implementation of relations over a ten-year period, it was prematurely superseded by the 2014 agreement calling for a new stage in the comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation, the 2014 Strategic Partnership.

In this case, China’s President Xi Jinping, was the co-signatory.  The involvement of Xi, who came to power in 2013, a year after Putin’s re-election as Russian president, has become a key driver in the intensification of bilateral relations.

After the Ukraine Crisis

The 2014 Strategic Partnership, ratified shortly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, amid the launch of U.S. and EU sanctions against Russia, is widely regarded as the most enhanced in terms of depth and breadth of economic, political, and security relations of any one of China’s or Russia’s network of strategic partnerships.

Some of the much-publicized and high-profile deals emerging from the 2014 Strategic Partnership included a 40-year gas supply agreement between Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). The landmark gas supply deal, including plans to build the “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline, was indirectly referred to in the 2014 Strategic Partnership as a measure aiming to “strengthen the Sino-Russian energy partnership.”

A further deal with Russia’s largest oil company, state-owned Rosneft, involving financing deals with CNPC to supply oil worth up to $500 billion from Russia’s largest oil field, was also established shortly after, prospectively enabling Russia to surpass Saudi Arabia as China’s main supplier of oil.

Also in 2014, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and the Central Bank of Russia signed an arrangement for a currency swap worth 150 billion yuan and 815 billion rubles ($24 billion at the time). The first such Chinese currency swap to be announced for any country outside of Asia, the deal was meant to facilitate settlement in national currencies and boost bilateral trade.

Since 2014, and particularly in 2015, Russia has become one of the five largest recipients of Chinese outbound direct investment in relation to the Chinese government’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) connecting Asia with Europe. Meanwhile, China was Russia’s largest bilateral trade partner, in 2015; in spite of declining overall bilateral trade in U.S. dollar terms (mainly due to sharp declines in the ruble as well as the yuan), relative to 2014, trade flows continued to expand in terms of volume.

In this context, it was significant that Russia’s exports of mechanical and technical products to China rose by about 45 percent over the course of 2015 possibly signifying an important trend in the diversification and competitiveness of Russia’s non-energy sector in terms of bilateral trade prospects with China.

Importantly, the economic relationship between China and Russia has been driven by a variety of bilateral intergovernmental commissions, including 26 subcommissions. According to Putin, in spite of often slow progress in reaching agreements, both sides invariably maintain a common goal of cooperation to eventually find a solution on a wide range of complex issues.

Integrating of High-Level Political Interests

Since the 2014 Strategic Partnership, amid a strengthening of personal ties in the Putin-Xi relationship, there has been an extensive broadening of bilateral relations beyond merely focusing on economic interests. This has centered on mutual support concerning each country’s “core interests,” including “strengthening close coordination in foreign policy.” They have also jointly advocated for reform of the international financial and economic architecture to accord with the rapidly-changing global real economy.

The relationship between China and Russia has, therefore, evolved into intensified cooperation in political areas in the last couple of years. Chief among those developments was the announcement on May 8, 2015 in Moscow, on the occasion of the annual parade commemorating the end of World War II, of the planned integration of the Chinese-led BRI with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).

The BRI comprises the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, with the objective of developing a trade and infrastructure network connecting Asia with Europe and Africa along the ancient Silk Road routes. The EEU groups Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia in an inward-focused trading network.

Beijing’s policy of integrating the BRI, its flagship international development program, with Moscow’s EEU stood in sharp contrast to the European Union’s Eastern Partnership program with former Soviet states. The latter program required these countries to sign up to EU economic and political associations and to relinquish their trade agreements and political affiliations with Russia.

Further evidence of the growing high-level political relations between China and Russia was manifested in the international financial markets under the co-arrangement of up to 6 billion yuan in “Baikalbonds” (a yuan-denominated Russian government bond issued in Russia).  The co-arrangers were China’s ICBC and state-owned Gazprombank — Russia’s third-largest bank, which has been under U.S. sanctions since July 2014.  This issuance of offshore yuan foreign sovereign bonds was the largest ever undertaken, exceeding the U.K. government’s earlier 3 billion yuan sovereign bond issue.

Both Putin and Xi reiterated the significance of their growing bilateral political relations at the BRICS development summit in Goa, India, in October 2015, where they noted that China and Russia should strengthen coordination and cooperation within global and regional multilateral institutions.

Intensification of Bilateral Cooperation in Multilateral Institutions

At the Hangzhou G20 Summit, held in September 2016, the China-Russia dialogue was accorded a high-level agenda by both leaders.  The dialogue focused, especially, on principles such as the “rule of law” in promoting tax and legal concepts for enhancing investments, investment protection, privatization, and the provision of state guarantees on finance for projects. There was also dialogue on how to bridge each side’s differing interpretations of legislative concepts, such as public-private partnerships and concession agreements.

At the level of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Putin and Xi’s proposals for integrating China’s BRI with the Russian-led EEU played a key role in significantly elevating the status of the SCO.  Although the SCO is a separate institution to the BRI and EEU, it is increasingly viewed by governments across the world as an organization reflecting the political and economic ascendancy of the Eurasian region. Partly, as a result, India and Pakistan, currently holding SCO observer status, have submitted applications for full membership, anticipated to become effective by early 2017. Moreover, an increasing number of other countries from around the world have also requested to join the organization.

At the recent November 2016 summit of SCO prime ministers, in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, China’s Prime Minister Li Keqiang proposed a free trade area among SCO members. The proposal was supported by Putin, who stated that the long-term economic interests of China and Russia should outweigh national protectionist sentiments to protect local producers.

The Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral grouping is considered by its participants as an important arrangement in securing political stability, both globally and in the region. India and Russia’s relations have remained strong for several decades, with Russia being India’s largest defense and nuclear energy partner. However, while China’s and Russia’s relations have clearly improved in the last few years, the China-India relationship has somewhat lagged the development of the other two legs of the triangle. Consequently, Russia has played a role in bringing both sides closer together through its interactions in the RIC grouping.

At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum held recently on November 2016, in Peru, Putin and Xi further reiterated their close cooperation and ongoing communication on policy matters with an international dimension. They agreed to promote the APEC bloc by fostering regional and economic growth strategies. This included their support for an Asia-Pacific free trade area for all 21 member states. Their joint support for regional free trade came on the heels of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump seeming to back away from the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement – an exclusive U.S.-led trade bloc including 12 states on both sides of the Pacific Ocean.

At the summit, Putin and Xi also affirmed their common interest in upholding security and stability in Central and Northeast Asia, as well as regions neighboring their countries’ borders.

Intensifying Cultural Exchanges

An important element of China-Russia relations, beyond the political and economic dimensions, has been the countries’ promotion of sociocultural integration at various levels of society. In this regard, toward the end of the APEC summit, Putin and Xi stated their interest in holding a 2017 China-Russia Media Exchange Year, wherein the media has become the most direct channel for communication between the two sides. Additionally, the two leaders stated their support for other cultural and people-to-people exchanges in the coming year.

The important role which the media increasingly plays in cultural matters was highlighted by recent headline reports about the gift of Russian ice cream by Putin to Xi, who declared it to be his favorite Russian dessert. The purpose of the media coverage was not only to portray an ever-closer personal relationship between the two leaders, but also to convey the idea of a growing friendship, built on a greater understanding of mutual cultural awareness, between Chinese and Russian peoples. Consequently, Xi’s interest in Russian ice cream has reportedly spawned a craze of interest for the dessert across China.

In early 2016, Putin and Xi urged that both countries’ legislative bodies enhance exchanges and mutual learning so as to further elevate China-Russia ties. Accordingly, Russia’s Federation Council and Russia’s State Duma, the upper and lower houses of the Russian parliament, respectively, and China’s National People’s Congress agreed to strengthen their cooperation on legislative initiatives and supervision to enhance coordination on regional, municipal and industrial development policies and plans.

Joint Military and Security Cooperation

A major feature of China’s and Russia’s defense and geostrategic interests has been rising levels of official support for each other’s security, increasingly pitched as common defense concerns. The most prominent recent affirmation of this position came in the form of China’s and Russia’s stated opposition to the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in South Korea, a decision made in mid-2016. Both governments have warned that THAAD risks igniting an arms race in the Asia-Pacific that could potentially destabilize the region.

In this vein, China and Russia have been accelerating their joint military drills including holding their first joint naval drills conducted in the South China Sea this year. According to senior officers at China’s Central Military Commission and Russia’s Defense Ministry, since both sides are faced with a more complex international security environment, closer mutual cooperation has been widely considered a necessity.

The Russian government has also voiced its support for the Chinese government’s position in the South China Sea, backing Beijing’s call opposing interference by powers outside the region. In turn, China has increasingly provided verbal support intimating its sympathy with Russia’s annexation of Crimea (mainly attributing the move to Crimea’s historical links as part of Russia), in addition to backing Russia’s intervention in Syria, while calling for a political settlement to the war.

Longer Term Headwinds 

Possibly the most serious undermining of the China-Russia relationship could come from its very success. As both countries integrate more quickly and as migration flows expand, there is likely to be mounting concern in Russia of a “Chinese takeover” of the sparsely-populated Russian Far East and other regions of Siberia.

Should this pose China’s and Russia’s greatest challenge going forward – in light of the popularity of Russia’s opposition nationalist party in the Far East and Siberian regions during the 2016 Duma elections – then both sides will need to need to consider jointly upgrading the regulation and monitoring of migration flows. Detailed satellite mapping of the two countries’ common border, in addition to having resolved all outstanding border disputes in 2005, should facilitate the necessary cooperation in managing migration across Russia’s politically-sensitive regions.

Conclusion

Driven by strengthening personal ties between Putin and Xi, the breadth and depth of China-Russia relations have spilled over into multiple spheres of governmental and institutional policymaking.  This has included both countries’ central governments, as well as regional and municipal governments, in addition to the increasing role played by state and private companies and various sectors of civil society.

As a result, the speed and scale of the relationship may be more aptly described as “revolutionary” rather than evolutionary. Clearly, external factors such as the Ukraine crisis were pivotal in turning the Russian leadership away from its post-Soviet relations with western Europe. The degree to which the Russian public were going to back their government’s shift from West to East, however, was more questionable.  Nevertheless, Chinese and Russian state-led activism in supporting this process has, thus far, brought some degree of success.

Bob Savic is a Senior Research Fellow at Global Policy Institute, London Metropolitan University and a Partner in Eurasia Corporate Services, St. Petersburg Capital Management LLP.

Deconstructing China’s Energy Security Strategy – Samir Tata – The Diplomat

Given continued American global naval supremacy, which is unlikely to be challenged successfully in the foreseeable future, Beijing’s highest strategic priority is to ensure energy security by connecting friendly major oil and gas producers to China via pipelines transiting through land routes beyond the effective military reach of the United States. If successful, within a generation China’s new “Silk Roads” – land pipelines, together with roads and railways – will transport enough oil and gas to meet the country’s import requirements.

Currently, China is highly dependent upon oil and gas imports, principally from the Persian Gulf and Africa, which are carried mainly by tankers over sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and through maritime choke points controlled by the U.S. Navy. An energy imports cut-off enforced by  a naval blockade would trigger a rapid collapse of China’s economy and paralyze its military forces, reducing the country to a paper dragon. The Pentagon is convinced that China will fail in its attempt to circumvent American control of the global maritime commons. Its 2016 annual report to Congress on China concludes: “Given China’s growing energy demand, new pipelines will alleviate only slightly China’s maritime dependency … the sheer volume of oil and liquefied natural gas that is imported … will make strategic SLOCs increasingly important to China.”

While the Pentagon’s assessment is certainly true for the short term, it would not be prudent to shape long term American grand strategy with respect to China on the premise of Beijing’s continued dependence on sea-borne energy imports.

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China’s Energy Insecurity

The Energy Information Administration (EIA), the statistical arm of the U.S. Department of Energy, in its International Energy Outlook 2016 estimates China’s oil imports in 2015 amounted to about 6.6 million barrels per day (b/d), representing 59 percent of the country’s total oil consumption. By 2035, the EIA projects China’s oil imports will rise to about 9.7 million b/d, accounting for about 62 percent of total oil consumption.

While not as stark as its dependency on imported oil, China’s reliance on imported natural gas is also significant. According to the EIA, China’s natural gas imports, which amounted to 1.4 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in 2015 (about 24 percent of consumption), are expected to rise to 6 Tcf (about 26 percent of consumption) in 2035. The EIA forecast on China’s energy imports implies a rather modest annual growth rate of about 2 percent for oil imports and a more robust 7.5 percent annual growth rate for gas imports.

By 2035, China’s GDP (in terms of purchasing power parity) will grow to $43.7 trillion, about 1.6 times larger than the $26.7 trillion projected for the United States or $27.8 trillion estimated for the European Union (EU). China certainly has the economic and financial capacity to underwrite the costs of its ambitious effort to develop alternate land routes to bypass current maritime routes.

Russia and Iran are the only two major energy exporters outside the camp of the United States who have significant enough oil and gas reserves to potentially satisfy all of China’s oil and gas import requirements on a sustainable basis. Beijing’s energy security strategy is designed around a simple and straightforward bargain: economic security for Russia and Iran (based on assured Chinese demand) in return for energy security for China (based on reliable and secure supply via land-based pipelines from Russia and Iran). In this case, interdependence is perceived to be mutually beneficial.

Engineering a Moscow Pivot

The EIA estimates that as of 2015 Russia has proved reserves of 80 billion barrels of oil and 1,688 Tcf of natural gas (the world’s largest reserves of gas). In 2015, it produced 11 million b/d of oil and 22.4 Tcf of gas, of which 7.5 million b/d of oil and 7.3 Tcf of gas were exported. By 2035, the EIA forecasts that Russian energy production will rise to 11.8 million b/d of oil and 29.3 Tcf of gas, of which 8.1 million b/d of oil and 12.3 Tcf of gas will be exported.

Per EIA’s base case projection, in 2035 Russia could satisfy about 85 percent of China’s oil import requirements (8.1 of 9.7 million b/d) and all of China’s needs for natural gas imports (6 Tcf). It is reasonable to assume that Russia could increase oil production above the base case projection by about 1 percent per annum over the next two decades to completely satisfy all of China’s oil import requirements in 2035. China shares a 4,179 kilometers (km) land border with Russia, so pipelines connecting Russian oil and gas fields to northeastern China would be secure and energy flows could not be effectively shut down by the United States.

Of course, transforming potential into reality will be both time-consuming and expensive, reflecting the need to develop oil and gas fields, increase production, and build and expand pipeline networks. From an energy security perspective, Russia would have to pivot from Europe to China. Currently, Russia is highly dependent upon energy exports to the European Union for its economic security. According to the EIA country analysis brief on Russia, energy exports accounted for about 43 percent of Russian government revenues in 2015. In that year, Russia sent about 60 percent of its oil exports (4.5 million b/d) and 75 percent of its gas exports (5.5 Tcf) to the EU (supplying about 30 percent of European requirements for imported oil and gas). In 2015, Russian oil exports to China amounted to a mere 852,000 b/d, accounting for about 13 percent of China’s imported oil requirements, while Russian gas exports to China were negligible. However, the imposition of U.S. and EU sanctions on Russia in the wake of its annexation of Crimea in 2014 has pushed Moscow to reorient its energy export strategy and shift its focus from Europe to China.  Russia’s need for economic security in the form of reliable demand for its energy exports is perfectly aligned with China’s need for energy security in the form of reliable supply to meet its energy imports requirements.

The nascent East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline connecting Russian oil fields in eastern Siberia to northeastern China (current planned capacity of 2.6 million b/d by 2020), and the Power of Siberia (POS) gas pipeline to northeastern China (current planned capacity of 3.3 Tcf by 2020) symbolize the beginning of the Sino-Russian energy partnership. In order to satisfy all of China’s energy import requirements by 2035, the capacity of the ESPO oil pipeline network would have to be quadrupled to 10.4 million b/d while the capacity of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline network would have to be doubled to 6.6 Tcf. Complementing the ESPO expansion project, there will have to be an expansion (additional capacity of about 5 million b/d) of the existing pipeline network connecting western and eastern Siberian oil fields to accelerate Moscow’s energy pivot, and a huge expansion of the spur line connecting ESPO to China (current planned capacity of 0.6 million b/d by 2018) to 10.4 million b/d.  These oil and gas pipeline expansion projects will have to be completed over the next 20 years – a very aggressive but not insurmountable undertaking.

The Persian Hedge

Strategic prudence (and history of tension between China and Tsarist as well as Soviet Russia) suggests that both Moscow and Beijing would seek to hedge their mutual interdependence. Accordingly, Russia will strive to maintain its energy ties to Europe while increasing its energy partnership with China. Likewise, China will seek to diversify its energy supply sources. From China’s energy security perspective, Iran represents an ideal hedge, as it is outside the control of both the United States and Russia. And Iran, which has endured the crippling effects of U.S.-led energy sanctions (targeted primarily against Tehran’s nuclear power program), clearly needs an alternative to energy exports to Europe. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), oil revenues accounted for about 46 percent of Iranian government revenues in 2014. Assured Chinese demand for its oil and gas exports would guarantee Iranian economic security.

The EIA estimates that as of 2015 Iran has proven reserves of 158 billion barrels of oil (the fourth largest after Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Canada) and 1,201 Tcf of natural gas (the second largest after Russia). Iran shares a common border with southwestern Pakistan while China shares a common border with northwestern Pakistan, so land-based oil and gas pipelines connecting Iran to China via Pakistan would make sense. China and Iran have no history of conflict, and China and Pakistan have been allies for over half a century.

Reflecting the impact of U.S.-led energy sanctions, EIA’s most recent figures indicate that Iran produced 3.4 million b/d of oil (2014) and 5.7 Tcf of gas (2013), of which 1.6 million b/d of oil and a negligible amount of gas (0.1 Tcf) were exported. In 2014, Iranian oil exports to China amounted to about 558,000 b/d (representing 9 percent of China’s oil imports). If, over the next two decades, Tehran can boost oil production at an annual growth rate of 6.75 percent while at the same time restraining annual domestic oil consumption growth to 2.5 percent, then by 2035 Iran’s oil exports would amount to 9.6 million b/d, reflecting oil production of 12.6 million b/d and oil consumption of 3 million b/d. Similarly, if Iranian natural gas production increases at an annual growth rate of 6.75 percent while domestic gas consumption growth is limited to 5 percent per annum, then by 2035 Iran’s gas exports would amount to 6.1 Tcf based on gas production of 21 Tcf and gas consumption of 14.9 Tcf.

The initial Iran-to-Pakistan energy pipeline has been built (although it would need to be significantly expanded), but the critical Pakistan-to-China portion is likely to take a generation to become reality. Beijing has committed to invest $46 billion for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) linking Pakistan’s port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea to Kashgar in Xinjiang province of western China. Assuring security for the network of roads, railways, and pipelines – the critical infrastructure of CPEC – running through Pakistan will be a major challenge. The Pakistani army is currently battling ethnic Baloch separatists along the Pakistan-Iran border, and radical Sunni fundamentalist groups such as ethnic Pashtun Pakistani Taliban along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Islamabad has also promised to establish a special 13,000-person security force to safeguard CPEC

Conclusion

The United States should not underestimate China’s ability to achieve energy security within the next two decades. China’s Silk Road strategy, which completely bypasses the global maritime commons, is Beijing’s non-military solution to U.S. global naval dominance. Once the new overland pipelines for black gold are fully operational, the United States no longer will have the ability to sever Beijing’s energy lifeline. And China may no longer be deterred from resorting to military action in support of its proclaimed core interests to force Taiwan reunification, seize the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands from Japan, and enforce its nine-dash maritime boundary in the South China Sea.

However, Beijing’s gain is not necessarily Washington’s loss. A realistic assessment of U.S. vital national interests in an increasingly multi-polar world would suggest that China’s limited aspirations do not adversely impact America’s global sphere of influence and its status as the sole global power. A modus vivendi is in the mutual interests of both countries.

Samir Tata is the founder of International Political Risk Analytics, based in Reston, VA.  He has previously served as an intelligence analyst with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, a staff assistant to Senator Dianne Feinstein, and a research associate with Middle East Institute, Atlantic Council, and National Defense University. 

Fuente: http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/deconstructing-chinas-energy-security-strategy/

La República Popular China anuncia por primera vez la botadura de un buque de inteligencia electrónica

La Marina de Guerra del Ejército Popular de Liberación chino incorpora el buque de inteligencia electrónica Kaiyangxing.

Origen: China anuncia por primera vez la botadura de un buque de inteligencia electrónica

El ascenso de Rusia y de China ‘abre el apetito’ a la Armada de EE.UU.

La Marina de EE.UU. ha solicitado un aumento de su flota desde los actuales 274 buques funcionales a los 355, el mayor desde los tiempos de la Guerra Fría.

Origen: El ascenso de Rusia y de China ‘abre el apetito’ a la Armada de EE.UU.

Inteligencia de EE.UU. ataca a cadenas de noticias Russia Today

El 6 de enero de 2017 la Oficina del Director Nacional de Inteligencia (ODNI, por sus siglas en inglés) publicó un informe titulado ‘Evaluación de las actividades e intenciones rusas en las recientes elecciones estadounidenses’.

Origen: Inteligencia de EE.UU. ataca a RT

Reflexión y análisis geopolítico desde el sur del sur del planeta

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